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Abstract 
This work provides a mathematical tool to derive Zipf-Pareto laws directly from the idea 
that living systems always follow the rule of least effort in their activities. In order to implement 
this idea in a general way taking into account the output of the effort as well, we introduce a 
functional of efficiency instead of effort. This efficiency is maximized simultaneously with the 
maximum of the total output of an ensemble of large number of agents all working for that 
output. The Zipf’s and Pareto’s laws naturally come out from this calculus of variation. This 
efficiency provides a possible measure of performance. 
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1) Introduction 
Zipf’s law is an empirical law describing the discrete distribution of some measured values 
x as a function of their rank r. If all the measured values are binned into W rank r in a decreasing 
order  (𝑥1 > 𝑥2 > 𝑥3 … . > 𝑥𝑟 … > 𝑥𝑊), Zipf’s law is in the following form [1][2] 
𝑥𝑟 =
𝑥1
𝑟𝛼
 
(1) 
where α is a parameter to be determined experimentally. For many systems, language for 
example, 𝛼 ≈ 1. For others it is quite different from unity. This regularity was first discovered 
by Jean-Baptiste Estoup [3] and then popularized by Zipf 30 years later. 
Zipf gave a first interpretation of this law[2] by considering the fact that all human being 
minimizes effort in his activities to get some fulfillment. This rule was first formulated in 1894 
by Guillaume Ferrero in his paper discussing the mental inertia of human being[4]. But Zipf 
was the first to explore its possible application to quantitative study. He wrote : “The power 
laws in linguistics and in other human systems reflect an economical rule: everything carried 
out by human being and other biological entities must be done with least effort (at least 
statistically)”. This rule was obviously an intuition from the observation of the behaviors of 
human being himself and probably of other animals. A summary is given in [5] about several 
experimental works checking the rule of least effort.  
The idea of least effort for human and animal systems is very appealing and even fascinating 
especially if it can be used for quantitative study in the same way as many variational principles 
in physics (stationary action, least time, maximum entropy etc.). However, no such 
implementation has been realized to date to our knowledge. The relationship between this 
beautiful principle and the Zipf’s law remains a sort of speculation without mathematical proof. 
In the past several decades, much attempt was made to interpret or derive this power law with 
different mechanisms and models. There are almost as many models proposed as the systems 
in which Zipf’s law and near-Zipf’s laws have been observed. The reader can find information 
online (google search giving 279 000 results to the keyword Zipf’s law, with a nice state of the 
art video1). Zipf’s law is closely related to Pareto distribution (to which google search gives 
11 000 000 results) which is a power law originally describing the wealth distribution of a 
population in a given society [6]: 
                                                 
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCn8zs912OE&t=53s 
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𝑃(𝑋 > 𝑥) = (
𝑥𝑚
𝑥
)
𝛽
 
(2) 
where X is a random variable representing the income, 𝑃(𝑋 > 𝑥) the probability of finding a 
person with income larger than a value x, 𝑥𝑚  the smallest income and 𝛽  a constant 
characterizing the distribution. This distribution law is the origin of the famous 20-80 rule of 
Pareto. It is believed that there is an intrinsic link between Zipf’s and Pareto’s laws. If one is 
observed in a system, another must exist simultaneously [5]. 
The aim of this work is to derive these laws directly from the idea of least effort. For this 
purpose, a functional of effort is necessary for the minimum calculus of variation. However, an 
effort is a cost whose nature differs in different domains. It can be an expenditure of energy, 
time, information, an amount of money and so on. It is difficult to define and quantify an effort 
in a general manner. In this work we focus on another relative quantity instead: the efficiency. 
This latter is defined by the useful output divided by the input, or effort, to get that output. 
Instead of minimizing effort, we can maximize the efficiency. The maximum efficiency 
(MAXEFF) has double advantages: the first being minimizing effort for a given output, and the 
second being to maximize the output with given effort. Hence MAXEFF seems to be a more 
general tool than least effort.  
The idea of maximum efficiency in science and engineering is not new. A good example is 
the derivation of the Betz limit of the efficiency of wind turbine from fluid mechanics2 [7]. The 
essential of the application of MAXEFF is to use an expression of efficiency as a function of 
some variables. We will adopt this method in this work. A functional of efficiency will be 
proposed by considering some examples of efficiency in thermodynamics and the fact that we 
are tackling a large number of engines (agents) in a statistical way, with probability distribution 
of the agents over some output. It is shown that the application of MAXEFF to this functional 
of probability distribution naturally leads to the Zipf’s and Pareto laws. 
2) The Nonadditivity of efficiency 
The definition of efficiency of a thermal engine in thermodynamics differs from one type 
of engines to another. For example, suppose an work engine absorbs an energy 𝑄1, produces a 
useful work W, and rejects an energy 𝑄2. In the ideal case without energy loss where all heat 
                                                 
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_195_Uq3dU, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Betz%27s_law 
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cost  𝑄1 − 𝑄2 is converted into work W, we have 𝑊 = 𝑄1 − 𝑄2. The efficiency of this engine 
is defined by 
𝐸 =
𝑊
𝑄1
= 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
 
     (3) 
For a heat pump engine (conditioner for heating for example) which absorbs a heat 𝑄1, 
consumes a work W, and produces a heat 𝑄2 for heating. We have 𝑊 = 𝑄2 − 𝑄1 if all work is 
converted into heat. Its efficiency is defined by𝐸 =
𝑄2
𝑊
=
1
1−
𝑄1
𝑄2
 or 
1
𝐸
=
𝑊
𝑄2
= 1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
 
     (4) 
For a refrigerator (conditioner for cooling for example) which absorbs a heat 𝑄1, consumes 
a work W, and rejects a heat 𝑄2 for cooling, we have 𝑊 = 𝑄2 − 𝑄1 if all work is converted into 
heat. Its efficiency is defined by 𝐸 =
𝑄1
𝑊
=
1
𝑄2
𝑄1
−1
 or  
1
𝐸
=
𝑊
𝑄1
=
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1 
     (5) 
The nonadditivity relationships of 𝐸 and of 
1
𝐸
 are similar (see calculation in the Appendix). 
In what follows, we only give a summary of the nonadditivity of 𝐸 for two working engines. 
Suppose two engines are connected in such a way that the first engine absorbs an energy 𝑄1, 
does a work 𝑊1, and rejects an energy 𝑄2, and the second engine absorbs an energy 𝑄2, does a 
work 𝑊2, and rejects an energy 𝑄3, one has 𝐸1 =
𝑊1
𝑄1
= 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
, 𝐸2 =
𝑊2
𝑄2
= 1 −
𝑄3
𝑄2
. The overall 
efficiency E of the ensemble of two engines is defined by  𝐸 =
𝑊1+𝑊2
𝑄1
= 1 −
𝑄3
𝑄1
 . It is 
straightforward to calculate 
𝐸 = 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 − 𝐸1𝐸2. (6) 
If the engines cannot transform all the heat cost (𝑄1 − 𝑄2 = 𝑊1 for the first engine for example) 
due to energy loss (friction, vibration, heat conduction, heat radiation and so on), we can 
introduce a loss coefficient a in such a way to write (see Appendix) 
𝐸 = 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 + 𝑎𝐸1𝐸2. (7) 
Formally, 𝑎 = −1 corresponds to the case where the energy cost is totally converted into work. 
If 𝑎 < −1, this is the case where the engines cannot transform all the heat cost into useful work, 
leading to a reduction of efficiency with respect to the case of 𝑎 = −1. On the contrary, if  𝑎 >
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−1, there is an enhancement of efficiency as if the collaboration created energy with respect to 
the 𝑎 = −1 case. This is possible only for processes in which the input and output are not 
energy or energy proportional quantities. This point will be discussed in the following section.  
More complicated nonadditivity forms are possible for the more general case where, for 
example, the second engine does not consume all the heat 𝑄2 rejected by the first engine. A 
parameter can also be used for describing this partial collaboration (see Appendix). In any case, 
we can write 𝐸 = 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 + 𝑓(𝐸1, 𝐸2) as a general nonadditive relationship.  
3) Modeling an ensemble of thermal engines 
Suppose an ensemble of a large number 𝑁 of engines (or agents). The functioning of each 
engine is independent. They can however collaborate in the sense that the output of one engine 
can be, at least partially, the input of others. We do not consider the case where engines have 
no communication or collaboration between them. Each engine has a certain efficiency 𝐸𝑛 with 
𝑛 = 1,2 … 𝑁 . The total efficiency 𝐸  of the ensemble should be a function of all  𝐸𝑛 : 
𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐸1, 𝐸2 … 𝐸𝑁). 
Efficiency is in general nonadditive, hence the total one 𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐸1, 𝐸2 … 𝐸𝑁) cannot be a 
simple sum of the individual efficiencies. On the basis of the above analysis of the nonadditivity 
relationships for different type of engines (doing work, heating, cooling) and different 
collaboration type, we can model the whole system by using a simple nonadditivity given by 
Eq.(7) which also reads (1 + 𝑎𝐸) = (1 + 𝑎𝐸1)(1 + 𝑎𝐸2). This equation can be written as, for 
the whole system of N engines: 
(1 + 𝑎𝐸) = ∏(1 + 𝑎𝐸𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
 
(8) 
where 𝑎 is a parameter that characterizes collaboration between the engines as well as the 
energy loss during the processes from input to output. For many systems, 𝑎 can be free from 
energy connection for non-thermodynamic processes for which the input and the output are not 
connected to energy. For these processes, there is no necessarily energy conservation condition. 
For example, for agents trying to get connected to some objects (sites, friends, cities, richness 
etc.), the output can be frequency of connection, the population or the agents’ richness. There 
is no energy conservation between these quantities and the inputs which can be energy cost, 
expenditure of time or money, used materials and so forth. Another example is the economic 
process of investment. This process is similar to the process of heating engine. The invested 
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amount of money can be assimilated to the input heat 𝑄1, the consumed input work  𝑊 is the 
effort to increase the profit, and the total turnover can be considered as the heat production 𝑄2. 
In thermodynamics there would be a conservation condition: 𝑄2 − 𝑄1 = 𝑊 . But this 
relationship does not exist for the economic process of investment because there is no 
quantitative measure of the effort  𝑊 and of its conversion to 𝑄2.  
Eq.(8) is obviously the simplest model for the efficiency as a nonadditive quantity. The 
mathematical advantage of this model will be shown later. A little bit more complicated model 
can be  
(1 + 𝑎𝐸) = ∏(1 + 𝑎𝑛𝐸𝑛)
𝑁
𝑛=1
 
 
(9) 
where 𝑎 is the parameter characterizing the whole ensemble and 𝑎𝑛 is the parameter of the n
th 
subsystem or agent. This composite model can be used when it is necessary to consider the 
composite effect of subsystems. In what follows, we focus on the ensemble as a whole, the one 
parameter model Eq.(7) or (8) will be used. 
4) Efficiency as a functional of probability 
Suppose that all agents in the ensemble are making effort to achieve as much as possible a 
measurable quantity represented by a variable 𝑋 having w discrete values 𝑥𝑖 with 𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑤. 
More they get that quantity, larger is 𝑥𝑖. This quantity can be income, wealth, city population, 
firm size, frequency of events, and so forth. At equilibrium (or stationary) states of the whole 
systems, all agents are distributed over the whole range of 𝑋 with 𝑛𝑖 agents at the value 𝑥𝑖. We 
have  ∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑤
𝑛=1 = 𝑁 . The probability 𝑝𝑖  of finding an agents at the value 𝑥𝑖  is 𝑝𝑖 =
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
. The 
normalization condition is  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑤
𝑖=1 = 1. 
Due to the statistical nature of the model with a large number of agents distributed over all 
the values of X, it is reasonable to suppose that the total efficiency 𝐸𝑖 of the agents on the value 
𝑥𝑖  depends on the number 𝑛𝑖  with 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑛𝑖) or on the probability distribution 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑖). 
The average efficiency E of the whole system reads 𝐸 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑤
𝑖=1 𝐸𝑖. 
Now let us separate the whole ensemble of agents into two independent subsystems A and 
B, with efficiency 𝐸𝑘(𝐴) and 𝐸𝑗(𝐵), respectively. The probability distribution of the agents in 
A is 𝑝𝑘(𝐴) and that in B is 𝑝𝑗(𝐵). The probability distribution of the whole ensemble can be 
written as 
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𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑘(𝐴)𝑝𝑗(𝐵) with 𝑖 = 𝑘𝑗 (10) 
We choose Eq.(7) as the efficiency nonadditivity. This implies a total efficiency given by 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(𝐴) + 𝐸𝑗(𝐵) + 𝑎𝐸𝑘(𝐴)𝐸𝑗(𝐵) (11) 
or (1 + 𝑎𝐸𝑖) = [1 + 𝑎𝐸𝑘(𝐴)][1 + 𝑎𝐸𝑗(𝐵)] . It is straightforward to show that Eq.(10) and 
Eq.(11) together imply (1 + 𝑎𝐸𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖
𝑏 or 
𝐸𝑖 =
𝑝𝑖
𝑏 − 1
𝑎
. 
(12) 
Obviouly 𝐸𝑘 and 𝐸𝑗 have the same functional of  𝑝𝑘 and  𝑝𝑗, respectively. 
The parameter b is related to a by the following considerations. First, due to the fact that 
the efficiency 𝐸𝑖 is positive and that 𝑝𝑖 is smaller than unity, 𝑏 should have opposite sign of 𝑎. 
Secondly, from Eq.(11), if 𝑎 goes to the zero limit 𝑎 → 0, the efficiency tends to additive limit 
𝐸𝑖 → 𝐸𝑘(𝐴) + 𝐸𝑗(𝐵). Taking into account Eq.(10), the only possible relationship is 𝑏 = −𝑎, 
i.e. 
𝐸𝑖 =
𝑝𝑖
−𝑎 − 1
𝑎
 
(13) 
which tends to 𝐸𝑖 = −ln𝑝𝑖 as a tends to zero, allowing the additive efficiency relationship 𝐸𝑖 =
−ln𝑝𝑘𝑝𝑗 = −ln𝑝𝑘 − ln𝑝𝑗 = 𝐸𝑘(𝐴) + 𝐸𝑗(𝐵) . Finally, the average efficiency of the whole 
ensemble of N agents reads 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖
𝑤
𝑘=1
=
∑ 𝑝𝑖
1−𝑎 − 1
𝑎
 
(14) 
in which the normalization ∑ 𝑝𝑖 = 1  is considered. From now on, if not specified, the 
summation is over all the w possible values (states) of X for the whole ensemble. 
5) Maximization of efficiency 
As mentioned in the introduction, following the idea of least effort, we propose to maximize 
the efficiency, meaning that a calculus of variation applied to the functional of the average 
efficiency in Eq.(14) with respect to the probability 𝑝𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2 … 𝑤). However, it is easy to 
verify that the maximization of E alone cannot lead to correct probability distribution. Indeed,  
𝛿𝐸 = 0  means 
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= 0  for all 𝑖 , leading to 𝑝𝑖 = ∞ for 𝑎 > 0  and 𝑝𝑖 = 0  for 𝑎 > 0  . If we 
introduce the normalization as a constraint of the variation,  𝛿(𝐸 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖) = 0 will lead to 
uniform distribution 𝑝𝑖 = 1 𝑤⁄  for all 𝑖, which is of course not what we are looking for. 
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This is because the maximum efficiency is not an isolated property. The efficiency is at 
maximum when fulfillment is the best due to the effort of the agents. Hence there must a 
connection between the efficiency and the fulfillment or the output. It is quite reasonable to 
associate the maximum of efficiency to the maximum output. The output is represented by the 
variable X. As a consequence, its average, ?̅? = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖, should be maximized at the same time 
as the efficiency. As mentioned above,  𝑋 can be the income, the frequency of events, the 
population of cities, the size of companies representing their wealth and so forth. In the case of 
income for example, if the maximum total efficiency is achieved, then the total income of the 
population should reach its maximum as well. In other words, the two maximums are mutually 
conditioned. The functional to be maximized should be the sum (𝐸 + 𝑐?̅?). We write now 
𝛿(𝐸 + 𝑐?̅?) = 0 (15) 
where 𝑐 is a constant multiplier characterizing the balance between the two maximums.  
6) Deriving Pareto law 
Eqs.(14) and (15) means 
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑖
(
𝑝𝑖
1−𝑎−1
𝑎
+ 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖) = 0 for all 𝑖. After the normalization, the 
result is 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝐶𝑥𝑖
−
1
𝑎 
(16) 
where the normalization constant 𝐶 = 1/ ∑ 𝑥𝑖
−
1
𝑎. Remember that 𝑝𝑖 is the probability of finding 
an agent at the value 𝑥𝑖 of X. The continuous version of the discrete distribution Eq.(16) is the 
probability density function 𝜌(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑥−
1
𝑎 with 𝑑𝑝(𝑥) = 𝜌(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 𝐶𝑥−
1
𝑎𝑑𝑥 the probability of 
finding an agent in the interval from 𝑥 to 𝑥 + 𝑑𝑥. The Pareto law follows from the integral of 
dp from x to the maximum value of X or infinity for simplicity: 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥) = ∫ 𝐶𝑥
−
1
𝑎𝑑𝑥
∞
𝑥
=
𝐶
1
𝑎
−1
𝑥−(
1
𝑎
−1)
. Since 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 1 with 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 the minimum value of X, one gets 
𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥) = (
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑥
)
1
𝑎
−1
 
 
(17) 
which is the Pareto distribution Eq.(2) with  𝛽 =
1
𝑎
− 1. 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥) is a decreasing distribution, 
it follows that 0 < 𝑎 < 1 and 0 < 𝛽 < ∞. 
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7) Deriving Zipf’s law 
Now let us put the values of X into W bins. These bins are ranked in a decreasing order in 
the magnitude of  𝑥. Let 𝑥𝑟 be the benchmark value of the bin of rank r, we have 𝑥1 > 𝑥2…>
𝑥𝑟>…>𝑥𝑊. The Zipf’s law Eq.(1) describes the relationship between 𝑥𝑟 and r. As mentioned 
above, the Zipf’s law and the Pareto law are regarded as two sides of the same thing. In the 
literature [5], they are connected one to another by the hypothesis that the probability 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥) 
is proportional to the rank r. 
By definition, the population (number of agents) having more income than 𝑥𝑟  increases 
with increasing 𝑟. In other words, 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥𝑟) increases when 𝑟 increases until the maximum 𝑊 
at which X reaches its minimum value 𝑥𝑊 and 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥𝑊) = 1. But it is a quite harsh condition 
to say that the population having more income than 𝑥𝑟 is proportional to 𝑟. This statement is 
true only when the population in all the bins is the same. In general, however, it is not excluded 
that the number of agents differs from one bin to another in some way. In what follows, Zipf’s 
law will be derived directly from MAXEFF without the assumption 𝑝(𝑋 > 𝑥𝑟) ∝ 𝑟. 
Instead of the average of X, we now use the average of the rank in the MAXEFF. However, 
if an agent increases its income X, its rank value decreases. Hence whenever  ?̅? = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖 has a 
maximum, the average rank ?̅? = ∑ 𝑝(𝑥𝑟)𝑟 should reach its minimum where 𝑝𝑟 = 𝐶𝑥𝑟
−
1
𝑎. The 
calculus of variation applies with 𝛿(𝐸 − 𝑐′?̅?) = 0  which should be maximum because 
(𝐸 − 𝑐?̅?) is a difference between the maximum 𝐸 =
∑ 𝑝𝑟
1−𝑏
𝑟 −1
𝑏
  (b is not necessarily equal to a) 
and the minimum ?̅?. This leads to 
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑟
(
𝑝𝑟
1−𝑏−1
𝑏
− 𝑐′𝑝𝑟𝑟) = 0 and 𝑝𝑟 = 𝐶′𝑟
−
1
𝑏. By definition of 
rank distribution, 𝑝𝑟 must be increasing function of r, hence b must be negative. For simplicity, 
let 𝛾 = −
1
𝑏
> 0, we have  
𝑝𝑟 = 𝐶′𝑟
𝛾      (18) 
Substituting this equation into  𝑝𝑟 = 𝐶𝑥𝑟
−
1
𝑎 gives  𝐶′𝑟𝛾 = 𝐶𝑥𝑟
−
1
𝑎 and 𝑥𝑟 = (
𝐶′
𝐶
)
−𝑎
𝑟−𝑎𝛾. Notice 
that 𝑥1 = (
𝐶′
𝐶
)
−𝑎
, Zipf’s law reads 
𝑥𝑟 =
𝑥1
𝑟𝛼
 with 𝛼 = 𝑎𝛾 (19) 
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8) Efficiency as a measure of performance 
Eq.(14) provides a possible measure of performance of the ensemble of agents as a whole 
all making effort for some fulfillment. Using the probability density function 𝜌(𝑥) =
1
𝑍
𝑥−
1
𝑎, we 
get the following expression of efficiency:  
𝐸 =
∫ 𝜌1−𝑎
∞
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑥 − 1
𝑎
 
(20) 
The partition function 𝑍 = ∫ 𝑥
−
1
𝑎𝑑𝑥
∞
𝑥𝑚
=
1
𝛽
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
−𝛽
. Choosing 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1, we get 𝑍 =
1
𝛽
=
𝑎
1−𝑎
. 
Since 0 < 𝑎 < 1  and 0 < 𝛽 < ∞ , the partition function is increasing function of a in the 
interval 0 ≤ 𝑍 < ∞  . The average of x is given by ?̅? = ∫ 𝑥𝜌
∞
𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑑𝑥 =
𝛽
𝛽−1
=
1−𝑎
1−2𝑎
 which 
increases with increasing a up to infinity for 𝑎 = 0.5 and becomes negative for 0.5 < 𝑎 ≤ 1. If 
we impose the condition of ?̅? ≥ 0, then 0 < 𝑎 ≤ 0.5 and 1 < 𝛽 < ∞.  
Finally, the integral in Eq.(20) can be calculated and gives 𝐸 =
𝑍𝑎?̅?−1
𝑎
=
1
𝑎
[(
1
1−𝑎
)
𝑎 1−𝑎
1−2𝑎
− 1]. This is an monotonically increasing function of a. 𝐸 becomes negative 
for 0 < 𝑎 < ~0.2  (~4 < 𝛽 < ∞), positive for 0.2 ≤ 𝑎 < 0.5 and infinity at 𝑎 = 0.5  (𝛽 =
1). This evolution of the efficiency is plotted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the efficiency of Eq.(20) as a function of the parameter a in 
the interval 0 < 𝑎 < 0.5 or 1 < 𝛽 < ∞. E diverges for a=0.5 or 𝛽 = 1.  
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It is worth noticing that the efficiency increases when 𝛽 decreases from infinity to 1, and 
that, in economy, decreasing 𝛽  implies increasing Gini coefficient G. This coefficient is a 
measure of the inequality in many fields such as economy, sociology, education, health science, 
ecology and so on3. 𝛽 = ∞ corresponds to 𝐺 = 0. This is the case of absolute equality (all 
agents have the same income for example). 𝛽 = 1  implies 𝐺 = 1 , the case of maximum 
inequality. Is there some intrinsic connection between the efficiency and the inequality? To 
answer this question, further investigation is necessary to fully explore the relationship between 
the efficiency and other ensemble properties (inequality, 80-20 rule, 20/20 ratio, performance, 
opportunity etc.).  
9) Conclusion and remarks 
We have implemented the idea of least effort via a calculus of variation for maximum 
efficiency to derive Zipf-Pareto laws. A functional of the efficiency for this purpose is proposed 
from the consideration of a simple nonadditive relationship of the efficiency of thermal engines 
in thermodynamics. The Zipf’s and Pareto’s laws come out naturally from this calculus of 
variation. This efficiency functional also provides a possible measure of the performance of the 
systems making effort for fulfillment. 
One of the underlying meaning of this approach is that Zipf-Pareto laws are ubiquitous for 
all systems composed of a large number of agents, no matter what are their nature and behavior, 
human beings, animals or objects recipient of effort, whenever they make effort to attain 
something or become objects of effort, Zipf-Pareto laws take place. As objects recipient of 
effort, one can think about words, webpages, cities, firms, books, phone numbers and so on. 
From this universality of power laws, we understand why the Pareto’s 80-20 rule or similar 
distributions happen so often everywhere whenever an effort is involved to attain or to generate 
some quantities.  
We used the nonadditivity Eq.(7) or (8) of the efficiency of the heat engines delivering 
work. The reader can notice in the appendix that, for the heating engine or the cooling engine, 
it is the inverse of the efficiency 1/E which has similar nonadditivity. This means that 1/E 
instead of E will have a functional similar to Eq.(14). But this problem does not change the 
calculus of variation of least effort and maximum efficiency, because if E has a maximum, 1/E 
should have a minimum, and the calculus of variation 𝛿 (
1
𝐸
+ 𝑐?̅?) = 0 will produce the same 
                                                 
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient 
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probability distribution if 1/E has the same functional as E used in the calculus 𝛿(𝐸 + 𝑐?̅?) = 0. 
This means that the result of the MAXEFF is independent of the type of the engines in the 
ensemble. 
It should be noticed that the results of this work are single power laws, showing a straight-
line in the log-log plot. In practice, most systems claimed to have Zipf-Pareto laws only show 
near-Zipf’s laws with more or less rapid cutoff (curve down) tails. It is possible to account for 
this behavior within this framework by separating the ensemble of agents into two or more 
subsystems which differ in behavior. This composite approach will be developed in another 
paper. It is also possible to explain the exponential distributions of certain complex systems [8] 
since the efficiency functional approaches logarithm form for small a. The MAXEFF can 
generate near-exponential probability distribution in this case.  
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Appendix 
Analysis of the nonadditivity of efficiency of some thermal engines. 
a) Nonadditivity of the efficiency of heat engine doing work 
The definition of efficiency of a thermal engine in thermodynamics differs for one type of 
engines to another. For example, suppose an engine absorbs an energy 𝑄1, does a useful 
positive work W, and rejects an energy 𝑄2. In the ideal case without energy loss where all heat 
cost  𝑄1 − 𝑄2 is converted into work W, we have 𝑊 = 𝑄1 − 𝑄2. the efficiency of this engine 
is defined by 
𝐸 =
𝑊
𝑄1
= 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
 
If two engines are connected in such a way that the first engine absorbs an energy 𝑄1, does a 
work 𝑊1, and rejects an energy 𝑄2, and the second engine absorbs the energy 𝑄2, does a work 
𝑊2, and rejects an energy 𝑄3, one has 𝐸1 = 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
, 𝐸2 = 1 −
𝑄3
𝑄2
, and the efficiency E of the 
ensemble of two engines is given by 
𝐸 =
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄1
= 1 −
𝑄3
𝑄1
= 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
𝑄3
𝑄2
= 1 − (1 − 𝐸1)(1 − 𝐸2) = 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 − 𝐸1𝐸2 
If the second engine absorbs a part of the energy 𝑄2, say, 𝑏𝑄2 (b<1), does a work 𝑊2., and 
rejects an energy 𝑄3, one has 𝐸1 = 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
, 𝐸2 =
𝑊2
𝑏𝑄2
=
𝑏𝑄2−𝑄3
𝑏𝑄2
= 1 −
𝑄3
𝑏𝑄2
, and the overall 
efficiency E of the ensemble of two engines: 
𝐸 =
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄1
=
𝑄1 − 𝑄2 + 𝑏𝑄2 − 𝑄3
𝑄1
=
(𝑏 − 1)𝑄2 + 𝑄1 − 𝑄3
𝑄1
=
(𝑏 − 1)𝑄2
𝑄1
+ 1 −
𝑄3
𝑄1
= (𝑏 − 1)(1 − 𝐸1) + 1 − (1 − 𝐸1)(1 − 𝐸2)
= (𝑏 − 1)(1 − 𝐸1) + 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 − 𝐸1𝐸2  
= (𝑏 − 1) + 𝐸1 − (𝑏 − 1)𝐸1 + 𝐸2 − 𝐸1𝐸2
= 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 − 𝐸1𝐸2 + (𝑏 − 1)(1 − 𝐸1) 
Now suppose not all heat Q1 − Q2 is converted into work W due to some lost, we can write 
𝑊 =
1
𝑎
(𝑄1 − 𝑄2) and 𝐸1 =
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
), 𝐸2 =
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄3
𝑄2
), 
where a>1 characterizes the loss of heat energy of the engines,  
𝐸 =
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄1
=
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄3
𝑄1
) =
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
𝑄3
𝑄2
) 
=
1
𝑎
[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝐸1)(1 − 𝑎𝐸2)] = 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 − 𝑎𝐸1𝐸2 
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or 
(1 − 𝑎𝐸) = (1 − 𝑎𝐸1)(1 − 𝑎𝐸2) 
If the two engines have different loss coefficients, say, 𝑎1 and 𝑎2, we have 𝐸1 =
1
𝑎1
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
), 
𝐸2 =
1
𝑎2
(1 −
𝑄3
𝑄2
), then 
𝐸 =
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄1
=
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄3
𝑄1
) =
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
𝑄3
𝑄2
) 
=
1
𝑎
[1 − (1 − 𝑎1𝐸1)(1 − 𝑎2𝐸2)] 
One gets 
(1 − 𝑎𝐸) = (1 − 𝑎1𝐸1)(1 − 𝑎2𝐸2) 
b) Nonadditivity of the efficiency of heat pump 
The definition of efficiency of a heat pump (heating engine) in thermodynamics is the 
following. Suppose heat pump absorbs a heat 𝑄1, consumes a work W, and provides a heat 
𝑄2 for heating. We have 𝑊 = 𝑄2 − 𝑄1  if all work is converted into heat. Its efficiency is 
defined by 
𝐸 =
𝑄2
𝑊
=
1
1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
 
1
𝐸
=
𝑊
𝑄2
= 1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
 
If two pumps are connected in series in such a way that the first pump absorbs an energy 𝑄1, 
uses a work 𝑊1, and supplies 𝑄2, and the second engine absorbs 𝑄2, consumes a work 𝑊2, and 
supplies 𝑄3, one has 
1
𝐸1
= 1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
, 
1
𝐸2
= 1 −
𝑄2
𝑄3
, and the overall efficiency E of the ensemble of 
two engines: 
1
𝐸
=
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄3
= 1 −
𝑄1
𝑄3
= 1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
𝑄2
𝑄3
 
= 1 − (1 −
1
𝐸1
) (1 −
1
𝐸2
) 
=
1
𝐸1
+
1
𝐸2
−
1
𝐸1
1
𝐸2
 
or 
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(1 −
1
𝐸
) = (1 −
1
𝐸1
) (1 −
1
𝐸2
) 
If not all the work W is converted into heat 𝑄1 − 𝑄2 due to some loss, let 𝑊 = 𝑎(𝑄1 − 𝑄2) 
𝐸1 = 𝑎
𝑄2
𝑊1
= 𝑎
𝑄2
𝑄2 − 𝑄1
=
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
)
 
1
𝐸1
=
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
) 
and 
1
𝐸2
=
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄3
) 
where a>1 characterizes the loss of heat energy of the engines. 
1
𝐸
=
1
𝑎
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄3
=
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄1
𝑄3
) 
=
1
𝑎
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄1
𝑄3
𝑄2
) =
1
𝑎
[1 − (1 − 𝑎
1
𝐸1
) (1 − 𝑎
1
𝐸2
)] 
=
1
𝐸1
+
1
𝐸2
− 𝑎
1
𝐸1
1
𝐸2
 
Or 
(1 − 𝑎
1
𝐸
) = (1 − 𝑎
1
𝐸1
) (1 − 𝑎
1
𝐸2
) 
If now the two pumps have different loss coefficients, say, 𝑎1 and 𝑎2, we have 
1
𝐸1
=
1
𝑎1
(1 −
𝑄1
𝑄2
) 
1
𝐸2
=
1
𝑎2
(1 −
𝑄2
𝑄3
) 
then 
(1 − 𝑎
1
𝐸
) = (1 − 𝑎1
1
𝐸1
) (1 − 𝑎2
1
𝐸2
) 
   
 17 
c) Nonadditivity of the efficiency of refrigerator 
The definition of efficiency of a refrigerator (cooling engine) is the following. Suppose a 
refrigerator absorbs a heat 𝑄1, consumes a work W, and rejects a heat 𝑄2 for cooling. We have 
𝑊 = 𝑄2 − 𝑄1 if all work is converted into heat. Its efficiency is defined by 
𝐸 =
𝑄1
𝑊
=
1
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1
 
1
𝐸
=
𝑊
𝑄1
=
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1 
If two refrigerators are connected in such a way that the first one absorbs an energy 𝑄1, uses a 
work 𝑊1, and rejects 𝑄2, and the second one absorbs 𝑄2, consumes a work 𝑊2, and rejects 𝑄3, 
one has 
1
𝐸1
=
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1, 
1
𝐸2
=
𝑄3
𝑄2
− 1, and the overall efficiency E of the ensemble of two engines 
reads: 
1
𝐸
=
𝑊1 + 𝑊2
𝑄1
=
𝑄3
𝑄1
− 1 =
𝑄3
𝑄2
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1 
= (
1
𝐸1
+ 1) (
1
𝐸2
+ 1) − 1 
=
1
𝐸1
+
1
𝐸2
+
1
𝐸1
1
𝐸2
 
or 
(
1
𝐸
+ 1) = (
1
𝐸1
+ 1) (
1
𝐸2
+ 1) 
And in case of loss with a coefficient 𝑎, we have 𝐸1 =
1
𝑎
(
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1), 𝐸2 =
1
𝑎
(
𝑄3
𝑄2
− 1), 
1
𝐸
=
1
𝐸1
+
1
𝐸2
+ 𝑎
1
𝐸1
1
𝐸2
 
(
𝑎
𝐸
+ 1) = (
𝑎
𝐸1
+ 1) (
𝑎
𝐸2
+ 1) 
And in case of loss with two different coefficients 𝑎1 and 𝑎2, we have 𝐸1 =
1
𝑎1
(
𝑄2
𝑄1
− 1), 𝐸2 =
1
𝑎2
(
𝑄3
𝑄2
− 1), one gets 
(
𝑎
𝐸
+ 1) = (
𝑎1
𝐸1
+ 1) (
𝑎2
𝐸2
+ 1) 
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. 
 
 
